Sökning: "disagreement"

Visar resultat 1 - 5 av 131 avhandlingar innehållade ordet disagreement.

  1. 1. Moral Disagreement and the Significance of Higher-Order Evidence

    Författare :Marco Tiozzo; Göteborgs universitet; []
    Nyckelord :HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; Moral Disagreement; Higher-Order Evidence; Moral Skepticism; Peer Disagreement; Faultless Disagreement; Moral Intransigence; Epistemic Rationality;

    Sammanfattning : Recent years have seen an increasing interest in the philosophy of disagreement, especially in epistemology where there is an intense debate over the epistemic significance of disagreement and higher-order evidence more generally. Considerations about disagreement also play an important role in metaethics – most prominently in various arguments that purport to establish moral skepticism. LÄS MER

  3. 2. Disagreement in agreement : a study of grammatical aspects of codeswitching in Swedish/Persian bilingual speech

    Författare :Leyla Naseh Lotfabbadi; Stockholms universitet; []
    Nyckelord :HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; Tvåspråkighet;

    Sammanfattning : .... LÄS MER

  4. 3. Guiding Concepts : Essays on Normative Concepts, Knowledge, and Deliberation

    Författare :Olle Risberg; Erik Carlson; Andrew Reisner; Wlodek Rabinowicz; Uppsala universitet; []
    Nyckelord :HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; action-guidance; adherence; all things considered ought; alternative normative concepts; conceptual engineering; debunking; deliberation; disagreement; epistemic pluralism; epistemology; ethics; external world skepticism; idealization; metaethics; meta-skepticism; moral skepticism; normativity; ought; reasons; response-dependence; uncertainty; Filosofi; Philosophy;

    Sammanfattning : This thesis addresses a range of questions about normativity, broadly understood. Recurring themes include (i) the idea of normative ‘action-guidance’, and the connection between normativity and motivational states, (ii) the possibility of normative knowledge and its role in deliberation, and (iii) the question of whether (and if so, how) normative concepts can themselves be evaluated. LÄS MER

  5. 4. La construcción de la imagen social en dos pares adyacentes: Opinión-acuerdo/desacuerdo y ofrecimiento-aceptación/rechazo : Un estudio de la conversación familiar sueca y española

    Författare :Susanne Henning; Diana Bravo; María Bernal; Domnita Dumitrescu; Stockholms universitet; []
    Nyckelord :HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; adjacency pairs; dis preferred turns; opinion-agreement disagreement; offer-acceptance rejection; autonomy face; affiliation face; role face; politeness; Conversation Analysis; Sociocultural Pragmatics; Swedish and Spanish family conversations; Spanish; spanska;

    Sammanfattning : The main purpose of this study is to conduct a contrastive analysis on a corpus of Swedish and Spanish family conversations with respect to two adjacency pairs: opinion-agreement/disagreement (OADs) and offer-acceptance/rejection (OARs). On one hand, from a structural perspective, based on the methodology of Conversation Analysis, one of the objectives is to observe how (dis)preferred turns of the OADs and OARs are managed by the interlocutors. LÄS MER

  7. 5. Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism

    Författare :Caj Strandberg; Praktisk filosofi; []
    Nyckelord :HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; epistemology; ideology; Praktisk filosofi; ideologi; kunskapsteori; metafysik; estetik; Morallära; Systematic philosophy; Moral science; Gilbert Harman.; Simon Blackburn; Michael Smith; J. L. Mackie; G. E. Moore; David Brink; Nicholas Sturgeon; moral explanation; argument from queerness; metaphysics; supervenience; fetishist argument; externalism; internalism; moral motivation; moral properties; open question argument; moral reason; moral disagreement; naturalism; reductionism; error-theory; Cornell realism; moral realism; non-cognitivism; meta-ethics; ethics; aesthetics;

    Sammanfattning : The main aim of this thesis is to defend moral realism. In chapter 1, I argue that moral realism is best understood as the view that (1) moral sentences have truth-value (cognitivism), (2) there are moral properties that make some moral sentences true (success-theory), and (3) moral properties are not reducible to non-moral properties (non-reductionism). LÄS MER