Sökning: "non-cognitivism"

Hittade 4 avhandlingar innehållade ordet non-cognitivism.

  1. 1. Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism

    Författare :Caj Strandberg; Praktisk filosofi; Göteborgs universitet; Gothenburg University; []
    Nyckelord :HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; epistemology; ideology; Praktisk filosofi; ideologi; kunskapsteori; metafysik; estetik; Morallära; Systematic philosophy; Moral science; Gilbert Harman.; Simon Blackburn; Michael Smith; J. L. Mackie; G. E. Moore; David Brink; Nicholas Sturgeon; moral explanation; argument from queerness; metaphysics; supervenience; fetishist argument; externalism; internalism; moral motivation; moral properties; open question argument; moral reason; moral disagreement; naturalism; reductionism; error-theory; Cornell realism; moral realism; non-cognitivism; meta-ethics; ethics; aesthetics;

    Sammanfattning : The main aim of this thesis is to defend moral realism. In chapter 1, I argue that moral realism is best understood as the view that (1) moral sentences have truth-value (cognitivism), (2) there are moral properties that make some moral sentences true (success-theory), and (3) moral properties are not reducible to non-moral properties (non-reductionism). LÄS MER

  2. 2. Communities of Judgment : Towards a Teleosemantic Theory of Moral Thought and Discourse

    Författare :Karl Bergman; Sharon Rider; Andrew Reisner; Marc Artiga; Uppsala universitet; []
    Nyckelord :HUMANITIES; HUMANIORA; HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; Ruth Millikan; teleosemantics; biosemantics; content; descriptive content; meta-semantics; meta-ethics; cognitivism; non-cognitivism; moral objectivity; moral relativism; moral disagreement; moral psychology; evolution of morality; Filosofi; Philosophy;

    Sammanfattning : This thesis offers a teleosemantic account of moral discourse and judgment. It develops a number of views about the function and content of moral judgments and the nature of moral discourse based on Ruth Millikan’s theory of intentional content and the functions of intentional attitudes. LÄS MER

  3. 3. Metaethical Relativism: Against the Single Analysis Assumption

    Författare :Ragnar Francén; Göteborgs universitet; Göteborgs universitet; Gothenburg University; []
    Nyckelord :HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; moral relativism; metaethical relativism; speaker relativism; appraiser;

    Sammanfattning : This dissertation investigates the plausibility of metaethical relativism, or more specifically, what I call “moral truth-value relativism”: the idea that the truth of a moral statement or belief depends on who utters or has it, or who assesses it. According to the most prevalent variants of this view in philosophical literature – “standard relativism” – the truth-values are relative to people’s moralities, often understood as some subset of their affective or desire- like attitudes. LÄS MER

  4. 4. Guiding Concepts : Essays on Normative Concepts, Knowledge, and Deliberation

    Författare :Olle Risberg; Erik Carlson; Andrew Reisner; Wlodek Rabinowicz; Uppsala universitet; []
    Nyckelord :HUMANITIES; HUMANIORA; HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; action-guidance; adherence; all things considered ought; alternative normative concepts; conceptual engineering; debunking; deliberation; disagreement; epistemic pluralism; epistemology; ethics; external world skepticism; idealization; metaethics; meta-skepticism; moral skepticism; normativity; ought; reasons; response-dependence; uncertainty; Filosofi; Philosophy;

    Sammanfattning : This thesis addresses a range of questions about normativity, broadly understood. Recurring themes include (i) the idea of normative ‘action-guidance’, and the connection between normativity and motivational states, (ii) the possibility of normative knowledge and its role in deliberation, and (iii) the question of whether (and if so, how) normative concepts can themselves be evaluated. LÄS MER