Sökning: "Moral Disagreement"
Visar resultat 1 - 5 av 12 avhandlingar innehållade orden Moral Disagreement.
1. Moral Reality. A Defence of Moral Realism
Sammanfattning : The main aim of this thesis is to defend moral realism. In chapter 1, I argue that moral realism is best understood as the view that (1) moral sentences have truth-value (cognitivism), (2) there are moral properties that make some moral sentences true (success-theory), and (3) moral properties are not reducible to non-moral properties (non-reductionism). LÄS MER
2. Moral Disagreement and the Significance of Higher-Order Evidence
Sammanfattning : Recent years have seen an increasing interest in the philosophy of disagreement, especially in epistemology where there is an intense debate over the epistemic significance of disagreement and higher-order evidence more generally. Considerations about disagreement also play an important role in metaethics – most prominently in various arguments that purport to establish moral skepticism. LÄS MER
3. Communities of Judgment : Towards a Teleosemantic Theory of Moral Thought and Discourse
Sammanfattning : This thesis offers a teleosemantic account of moral discourse and judgment. It develops a number of views about the function and content of moral judgments and the nature of moral discourse based on Ruth Millikan’s theory of intentional content and the functions of intentional attitudes. LÄS MER
4. The Duality of Moral Language : On Hybrid Theories in Metaethics
Sammanfattning : Moral language displays a characteristic duality. On the one hand, moral claims seem to be similar to descriptive claims: To say that an act is right (or wrong) seems to be a matter of making an assertion, thus indicating that the speaker has a moral belief about which she can be correct or mistaken. LÄS MER
5. Guiding Concepts : Essays on Normative Concepts, Knowledge, and Deliberation
Sammanfattning : This thesis addresses a range of questions about normativity, broadly understood. Recurring themes include (i) the idea of normative ‘action-guidance’, and the connection between normativity and motivational states, (ii) the possibility of normative knowledge and its role in deliberation, and (iii) the question of whether (and if so, how) normative concepts can themselves be evaluated. LÄS MER