Separation av företagsledning och finansiering : fallstudier av företagsledarutköp ur ett agentteoretiskt perspektiv

Sammanfattning: The interaction between owners, management team and lenders in companies form a natural part of modern industry and commerce. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether separation of management and financing in companies causes costs. In the study financing relates both to debt finance and equity finance provided by others than members of the management team.The study is based on an agency theoretical perspective. According to agency theory, specific costs arise in contractual relationships, namely agency costs. In order to draw conclusions regarding the costs of separation between management and financing, this study investigates the change in agency costs in the contractual relationships between the owners and the management team and the lenders and the owner/management group, respectively, due to a management buy-out, MBO. A MBO is an acquisition of a company or part of a company, where the company’s management team constitutes or forms part of the group of investors and where the acquisition normally is financed with an above average proportion of debt finance in relation to equity finance.The results of the study indicate that the value of a company is related to how the company is financed. In companies where the management teams do not own the company, costs seem to arise because the companies are not managed in a value-maximizing way. Costs also seem to arise because of monitoring and bonding activities in the relationship between the owners and the management team. In companies where the owner/management group do not finance the whole company but debt finance is used, costs seem to arise primarily because of scarcity of capital and deteriorated conditions in the relations with lenders and suppliers. Costs seem to arise because of monitoring and bonding activities as well.