Tillräknelighet som straffrättslig ansvarsförutsättning

Sammanfattning: This doctoral thesis examines the doctrine of imputability in relation to Swedish criminal law. According to said doctrine, individuals may be held criminally liable only if they possessed the capacity to comprehend and be guided by the norms of the criminal law at the time of the act (capacity-responsibility). Most criminal law systems express this normative idea through a so-called insanity rule, which exempts from criminal liability perpetrators who acted in a severely aberrant mental state. In Swedish criminal law, however, no such rule exists. Building upon this premise, the thesis aims to enhance understanding of criminal imputability as a prerequisite for criminal liability in the Swedish legal discourse. Specifically, the thesis pursues two main objectives: first, to elucidate how the doctrine of criminal imputability is manifested in Swedish criminal law despite the absence of an insanity rule, and second, to highlight the potential functions that such a rule could perform within the Swedish criminal law system. The thesis argues that although the Swedish Criminal Code lacks an insanity rule related to criminal liability, the doctrine of imputability to some extent influences both the general rules of sanctions and liability. Regarding the potential functions of an insanity rule, the thesis proposes three such functions: a practical function to facilitate the examination of liability in cases involving significantly aberrant mental states, a backward-looking function to ensure individuals lacking capacity-responsibility are not unjustly held criminally liable, and a forward-looking function to prevent automatic release into society of perpetrators acquitted under criminal law due to lack of capacity-responsibility at the time of the offense.