Sökning: "philosophy of action"
Visar resultat 16 - 20 av 180 avhandlingar innehållade orden philosophy of action.
16. Guiding Concepts : Essays on Normative Concepts, Knowledge, and Deliberation
Sammanfattning : This thesis addresses a range of questions about normativity, broadly understood. Recurring themes include (i) the idea of normative ‘action-guidance’, and the connection between normativity and motivational states, (ii) the possibility of normative knowledge and its role in deliberation, and (iii) the question of whether (and if so, how) normative concepts can themselves be evaluated. LÄS MER
17. Applying Utilitarianism. The problem of practical action-guidance : Att tillämpa utilitarismen. Problemet med praktisk handlingsvägledning
Sammanfattning : This dissertation addresses the question of whether act-utilitarianism (AU) can provide practical action-guidance. Traditionally, when approaching this question, utilitarians invoke the distinction between criteria of rightness and methods of decision-making. LÄS MER
18. Konsten att uppfinna hjulet två gånger : om uppfinnandets teknik och estetik
Sammanfattning : “There is no need to reinvent the wheel” – a cliché, often told when you want to come up with something new that in someway can be connected to something that already exist. This study shows the opposite – that inventions emanate from what is given. LÄS MER
19. Voluntary Coercion. Collective Action and the Social Contract
Sammanfattning : This work provides a game theoretical analysis of the classical idea of a social contract. According to what we might call the Hobbesian justification of the state, coercion is necessary in order to provide people with basic security and to enable them to successfully engage in mutually beneficial cooperation. LÄS MER
20. A Different Kind of Ignorance : Self-Deception as Flight from Self-Knowledge
Sammanfattning : In this dissertation I direct critique at a conception of self-deception prevalent in analytical philosophy, where self-deception is seen as a rational form of irrationality in which the self-deceiver strategically deceives himself on the basis of having judged that this is the best thing to do or, in order to achieve something advantageous. In Chapter One, I criticize the conception of self-deception as analogous to deceiving someone else, the so-called “standard approach to self-deception”. LÄS MER