Sökning: "compatibilism"

Hittade 3 avhandlingar innehållade ordet compatibilism.

  1. 1. Practical Perspective Compatibilism

    Författare :Sofia Jeppsson; Gunnar Björnsson; Ragnar Ohlsson; Derk Pereboom; Stockholms universitet; []
    Nyckelord :HUMANITIES; HUMANIORA; HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; Free will; moral responsibility; moral agency; compatibilism; incompatibilism; determinism; the practical perspective; practical freedom; Fri vilja; moraliskt ansvar; moraliskt agentskap; kompatibilism; inkompatibilism; determinism; det praktiska perspektivet; praktisk frihet; Practical Philosophy; praktisk filosofi;

    Sammanfattning : In this dissertation, I argue for what I call “practical perspective compatibilism”. According to this thesis, an agent with practical freedom is sufficiently free to be a moral agent and morally responsible for his or her actions.The concept of practical freedom is originally found in the writings of Kant. LÄS MER

  2. 2. The Consequence Argument : An Essay on an Argument for the Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism

    Författare :Maria Svedberg; Jens Johansson; Erik Carlson; Helen Beebee; Stockholms universitet; []
    Nyckelord :HUMANITIES; HUMANIORA; HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; consequence argument; free will; determinism; compatibilism; incompatibilism; Peter van Inwagen; ability; laws of nature; Practical Philosophy; praktisk filosofi;

    Sammanfattning : This book is a contribution to the debate on free will and determinism. More specifically, it is an examination of Peter van Inwagen’s highly influential “Consequence Argument” for incompatibilism, i.e., the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. LÄS MER

  3. 3. Minds, Brains and Desert: On the relevance of neuroscience for retributive punishment

    Författare :Alva Stråge; Göteborgs universitet; Göteborgs universitet; Gothenburg University; []
    Nyckelord :HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; Desert; Responsibility; Philosophy of Mind; Neurolaw; Retributivism; Folk Psychology; Folk Morality;

    Sammanfattning : It is a common idea, and an element in many legal systems, that people can deserve punishment when they commit criminal (or immoral) actions. A standard philosophical objection to this retributivist idea about punishment is that if human choices and actions are determined by previous events and the laws of nature, then we are not free in the sense required to be morally responsible for our actions, and therefore cannot deserve blame or punishment. LÄS MER