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Visar resultat 1 - 5 av 16 avhandlingar som matchar ovanstående sökkriterier.
1. Modelling Bidding Behaviour in Electricity Auctions : Supply Function Equilibria with Uncertain Demand and Capacity Constraints
Sammanfattning : In most electricity markets, producers submit supply functions to a procurement uniform-price auction under uncertainty before demand has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), every producer commits to the supply function that maximises his expected profit given the bids of competitors. LÄS MER
2. Allies Yet Rivals : Input Joint Ventures and Their Competitive Effects
Sammanfattning : Essay I explores the competitive effects of input joint ventures, more precisely the connection between horizontal product differentiation and competition. Four quantity-setting downstream firms jointly and symmetrically own two upstream firms in pairs. LÄS MER
3. Heterogeneity in oligopoly : theories and tests
Sammanfattning : This dissertation consists of five separate chapters, of which the three first three are empirical and the last two are theoretical. Chapter 1: Competition in Interrelated Markets: An Empirical Study. (Co-authored with Marcus Asplund.)This chapter studies competition in small, concentrated and interrelated markets. LÄS MER
4. Market power in the Swedish banking oligopoly : a game-theoretic model of competition applied to the five big Swedish banks 1989-97
Sammanfattning : This thesis aims at assessing the degree of competition among the five dominating Swedish banks during the period 1989-1997. In so doing, it also aims to develop a general oligopoly model with the specific purpose of providing a tool for an improved methodology for the evaluation of market power in oligopolistic markets, and to demonstrate the empirical application of this methodology. LÄS MER
5. Games and Markets - Essays on Communication, Coordination and Multi-Market Competition
Sammanfattning : This thesis consists of a collection of essays on coordination in games and competition in international oligopolies. The first essay presents a theoretical analysis of a simple coordination game in which players simultaneously choose efforts from a compact interval. The original game has a continuum of Pareto-ranked equilibria. LÄS MER