Sökning: "Economic voting"
Visar resultat 36 - 40 av 50 avhandlingar innehållade orden Economic voting.
36. Essays on Mechanism Design
Sammanfattning : This thesis makes a contribution to mechanism design: a field of economic theory concerned with constructing and analyzing economic mechanisms. Examples include design of auctions, voting systems, school choice, kidney exchange and many more. The thesis consists of four separate papers. LÄS MER
37. Essays on Dynamic Political Economy
Sammanfattning : This thesis consists of three papers in dynamic political economy:"Ideology and the Determination of Public Policy Over Time" investigates how public policy responds to persistent ideological shocks in dynamic politico-economic equilibrium. We develop a tractable model to analyse the dynamic interactions among ideology, public policy and individuals' intertemporal choice. LÄS MER
38. Radical Right, Identity, and Retaliation
Sammanfattning : Economic Distress and Support for Far-right Parties – Evidence from Sweden. This paper studies the effects of economic distress on support for far-right parties. LÄS MER
39. Essays on Gender, Development and Political Economy
Sammanfattning : The Long-Run Impact of Protestant Missionary Activity on Female Labour-Force ParticipationResearch has shown that missionary activity, in general, and Protestant missionary activity, in particular, has had a long-lasting positive effect on literacy, education and democratic values. In this chapter, I analyse the differential effect of early 20th century Protestant and Catholic missionary activity in three former British colonies - Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda - on female labour-force participation with a particular focus on formal-sector employment. LÄS MER
40. Models of Electoral Competition : Three Essays on Political Economics
Sammanfattning : This thesis consists of three essays in theoretical political economics. In "The Swing Voters' Blessing", I model elections with quality differences between two ideological candidates. The quality differences are only observable to a limited number of informed voters. LÄS MER