On Coordination in Multi-agent Systems

Sammanfattning: Agent technology enables the designers of computer based systems to construct software agents that are able to model attitudes. We present a frame-work in which these artifacts aim to express the preferences of both their designers and their owners. Just like human societies need rules, regula-tions, norms and social laws, in order to function, societies of agents need coordination mechanisms in order to work efficiently. We show why some higher level goals of agents are incompatible, e.g. the automatic creation of coalitions among agents, and at the same time being self-interested and boundedly rational. One way to model the outcome of planned interactions between agents is to apply game theory. We use game theory for proving some results, e.g. a No free lunch" theorem. For more practical applications, however, other approaches are often needed. One such domain is dynamic resource allocation, where agents through auction mechanisms or different kinds of mobile broker techniques solve the problem of coordinating the allocation. We present comparisons of the results of simulations of several of these approaches in a telecommunication networks application. Another interesting domain concerns mobile robots for playing soccer. To model this problem, a novel approach called artificial electrical fields, is used for both navigation and manipulation of objects.