Påföljdskonkurrens - problem och principer

Sammanfattning: This is a thesis in criminal law concerning concurrence of crimes and principles of sentencing multiple offenders. Concurrence of crimes occurs in situations where more than one rule (or the same rule several times) can be applied on a certain case. The fact that it is possible to apply the law more than once does not imply that this is also appropriate. When dealing with concurrence of punishment, it is always established that the offender is to be convicted of more than one crime. The main question is what principles should be used in sentencing multiple offenders. Traditionally a number of legislative models and principles have been used, which all are reflections of three principles, namely the principles of cumulation, absorption and asperation.Depending on whether sentencing multiple offending arises on one occasion or on different occasions, distinct types of problems of concurrence occur. The special feature that distinguishes sentencing multiple offenders on different occasions is the time aspect. Under the condition that the previous sentence has not been fully implemented when the new criminality is committed, the court is obliged to—to various extents—take the previous sentence into account when deciding on the new sentence. Thus, the sentencing becomes iterative.The overarching purpose of the thesis is to examine what principles underpin the regulation on sentencing multiple offenders and whether these principles are compatible with the general principles and the ideology of sentencing in Swedish law. A further purpose is to reconstruct the principles applied in iterative sentencing and to examine whether these principles correspond with the general principles of sentencing. My conclusion is that the Criminal Code Ch. 34 rests on partly different rationales and values than the ones governing the Swedish sentencing policy. Hereby, the regulation causes a number of practical problems. The main proposal is that the concurrence doctrine should be based on the same rationales and ideological foundation as the regulation of sentencing in general.