Vileförklaringen och dess innehåll: Om avtalsrättslig begreppsbildning och systematik; (Declaration of legal intent and it's content: A study of concept formation and systematics in contract law

Sammanfattning: The concept "declaration of legal intent" belongs to the legal tradition of most European countries. Different versions of a theory pertaining to the declaration of legal intent have been elaborated, all with a view to rendering the concept itself more precise: what conception of "intent" or "will" (counterparts of the latter word being used in several languages, for instance the Swedish viljeförklaring) is relevant; what is meant by "intent" or "will" being "declared"; and so on. The point of departure is that the individual person is, by virtue of declaring his/her property, etc. Ever since the latter half of the 19th century, however, a number of authors have criticised the concept of "declaration and legal intent". They have argued that what is referred to as a declaration of legal intent in the realm of civil law cannot, on purely logical grounds, constitute an announcement of, or a statement concerning, a matter of will. This thesis maintains that the criticism which has been directed against the concept in question is, in all essentials, misguided. It also provides a new analysis and determination of the legal terms "declaration of legal intent" and "the content of a declaration of legal intent". The analysis takes account of results from research in psychology and linguistic philosophy performed during the last few decades. At the same time, it establishes connections with classic legal doctrines. The purpose of the study is to arrive at a tenable definition germane to Swedish law, albeit a large proportion of the analysis has a wider and more general range. The thesis argues that a person has declared if he/she has ensured that an opposite party has reason to conclude that he/she possesses that intent. Here, the term "ensure" is made to imply that the declarer has performed a certain action and that he/she, as a "rational individual", has been able to foresee what the opposite party has reason to conclude.