A Sequence of Essays on Sequences of Auctions

Författare: Daniel Bougt; Ola Andersson; Per Hjertstrand; Uppsala Universitet; []

Nyckelord: SOCIAL SCIENCES; SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP; SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP; SOCIAL SCIENCES; declining price anomaly; sequential auctions; train-ticket auctions; ambiguity aversion; risk aversion; non-parametric estimation; experiment; Economics; Nationalekonomi;

Sammanfattning: Essay I (with Gagan Ghosh and Heng Liu). The existence of declining prices in sequential auctions is a well-documented empirical pattern. Three explanations that can explain the puzzle are bidders being risk averse, loss averse, or ambiguity averse. We use a data set on bids and prices from sequential auctions of train tickets to confirm the existence of declining prices. We further document bidder behavior that is inconsistent with bidders being risk averse or bidders being loss averse.

  KLICKA HÄR FÖR ATT SE AVHANDLINGEN I FULLTEXT. (PDF-format)