Victims of War

Sammanfattning: In my thesis, I explore the moral status of different types of agents who suffer harm. I seek to determine whether these agents are victims of wrongful harm, that is, whether they had a right not to suffer harm. Since a victim has certain claims on others - including claims to aid or compensation, to the punishment of the victimizer, or to an apology - it is important to establish who counts as a victim and how victims’ claims compare in strength. In the thesis, I consider the moral status of accomplices, risk-takers and provocateurs, and explore the extent to which such people might lack rights against harm. I also consider the comparative status of victims of unjustified harm and victims of justified harm. I focus on these types of agents because their victimhood is challenged by recent arguments in the literature. I show that some of these arguments unjustifiably weaken or deny a sufferer’s victimhood and her concomitant rights.In the first paper, I argue that accomplices, those who contribute to but do not directly pose a threat, often forfeit rights to a lesser extent than principal wrongdoers who pose the threat. Treating accomplices as morally on par with principals would often wrong them. I offer an account that helps to determine the extent to which an accomplice lacks rights against harm. In the second paper, I argue against the view that taking a risk of suffering a wrongful harm diminishes the strength of one’s right against the harm. Risk-takers compromise their rights only if their risk-taking imposes unjustifiable costs. In the third paper, I argue that provocateurs are similar to agents who contribute to another’s wrongful threat. In contrast to wrongdoers who forfeit their rights in proportion to the threat they pose, provocateurs often forfeit rights only against a lesser harm. Treating provocateurs as morally on par with wrongdoers would therefore wrong them. Lastly, I consider innocent victims of justified harm and innocent victims of unjustified harm. I argue that the stringency of their claims to compensation does not differ. I thereby push back against arguments that want to see the perceived differential moral residue of justified and unjustified harm reflected in the victim’s compensation claim. In order to defend my conclusion, I discuss the grounds on which compensation is owed to innocent victims of justified harm in the fourth paper.