Ett gemensamt styrelserum : rättsliga förutsättningar för att åstadkomma en jämn könsfördelning genom kvotering

Sammanfattning: Many countries have set political goals in order to achieve an equal gender balance on company boards. A common intervention to reach these goals is the introduction of mandatory quota rules. The overall purpose of this doctoral thesis is to study legal obstacles and legal possibilities that arise in the conflict of interest between gender equality and autonomy for corporations [Gesellschaftautonomie], when a Member State such as Sweden adopts a mandatory quota rule to achieve an equal gender balance on boards of companies listed on the stock market [aktiemarknadsbolag].The study analyses different types of regulatory models – legislation and corporate self-regulation – based on mandatory quota rules. First, the study addresses if a limitation of constitutional rights such as the protection of property and non-discrimination can be constitutionally permissible in this context. Second, the study examines legal support within EU law for a Member State such as Sweden to introduce mandatory quota rules to achieve an equal gender balance on boards of companies listed on the stock market. Measures undertaken to effectuate such a limitation need to be rationally connected to and necessary to the fulfilment of a permissible purpose to be legally justifiable. Third, therefore, the study explores whether a mandatory quota rule in order to achieve an equal gender balance on the boards of companies listed on the Swedish stock market can be justified. Fourth and finally, it is analysed whether such measures can be effectuated while still upholding the general principles of corporate law.Findings include that the effect of a quota rule would, in the Swedish context, probably be the same regardless of whether legislation or corporate self-regulation would be relied upon as the mechanism to achieve an equal gender balance on company boards. However, a regulatory model introduced by the stock market’s regulators in the listing agreement would probably not meet as much critique as a state-initiated regulatory model.