Sökning: "Free will"

Visar resultat 1 - 5 av 716 avhandlingar innehållade orden Free will.

1. 1. Falling Freely : Anselm of Canterbury on the Will

   Författare :Tomas Ekenberg; Lilli Alanen; Mikko Yrjönsuuri; Calvin Normore; Uppsala universitet; []
   Nyckelord :HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; Philosophy; Anselm of Canterbury; will; choice; action; free will; determinism; metaphysics; ethics; evil; Filosofi; Philosophy subjects; Filosofiämnen; teoretisk filosofi; Theoretical Philosophy;

   Sammanfattning : This thesis clarifies the concept of will in Anselm of Canterbury in the context of his overall theologico-philosophical project. The will is central to Anselm's understanding of freedom of choice (libertas arbitrii), which he defines as “the power to keep rightness of will”. LÄS MER

3. 2. On Free Will as Categorical and Conditional Freedom

   Författare :Peter Ryman; Erik Carlson; Michael Zimmerman; Uppsala universitet; []
   Nyckelord :HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; Free Will; Existence of Free Will; Moral Responsibility; Autonomy; Can; Could; Ought; Categorical Freedom; Agent Causation; Conditional Freedom; Conditional Analysis; Infinite Regress Argument; Ability and Opportunity; Consequence Argument; Mind Argument; Peter van Inwagen; Harry Frank-furt; David Lewis; Robert Kane; Galen Strawson; Erik Carlson; Keith Lehrer; Krister Segerberg; Counterfactuals; Supplementers; Laws of Nature; Causally Complete; Physicalism; Closure of Physics; Supervenience.; Praktisk filosofi; Practical Philosophy;

   Sammanfattning : This dissertation is about a complex of problems, related to the question: ‘Can we ever act differently from how we in fact act?’In Part I, the meaning of ‘can’ and ‘could’ is discussed. It is argued that when we say that an agent could do something he didn’t do (in a sense of ‘could’ involving control), this means, in what is called ‘Decision-Contexts’, that he was conditionally free to do it, and, in what is called ‘Strong-Autonomy-Contexts’, that he was categorically free to do it. LÄS MER

4. 3. The Consequence Argument : An Essay on an Argument for the Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism

   Författare :Maria Svedberg; Jens Johansson; Erik Carlson; Helen Beebee; Stockholms universitet; []
   Nyckelord :HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; consequence argument; free will; determinism; compatibilism; incompatibilism; Peter van Inwagen; ability; laws of nature; Practical Philosophy; praktisk filosofi;

   Sammanfattning : This book is a contribution to the debate on free will and determinism. More specifically, it is an examination of Peter van Inwagen’s highly influential “Consequence Argument” for incompatibilism, i.e., the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. LÄS MER

5. 4. Empirical data in the philosophy of mind: free will, higher-order thought, and misrepresentation

   Författare :Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup; CogComlabbet; []
   Nyckelord :Consciousness; higher-order thought; misrepresentation; Free Will; change blindness; Charles Bonnet Syndrome; Choice Blindness; Wholeheartedness; Introspection;

   Sammanfattning : This thesis investigates two areas of the philosophy of mind where empirical data play a role in philosophical argument. The first area, investigated in three papers, is the higher-order thought theory of consciousness, and specifically the possibility of higher-order thoughts misrepresenting what state an individual is actually in. LÄS MER

7. 5. Minimal Optimism : Reading P. F. Strawson on Responsibility

   Författare :Anton Emilsson; Praktisk filosofi; []
   Nyckelord :HUMANIORA; HUMANITIES; P. F. Strawson; responsibility; free will; scepticism; naturalism; free will scepticism; Compatibilism; philosophical methodology; pragmatic genealogy; blame;

   Sammanfattning : Peter Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (1962) has reoriented the way moral philosophers think about responsibility. There is a general sense that Strawson’s approach holds the promise that we may move beyond the traditional discussion of free will in recognition of the fact that whether determinism is true is irrelevant for whether we are responsible beings. LÄS MER