Gud för oss : Om den non-metafysiska realismen och dess konsekvenser för religionsfilosofins uppgift och natur

Sammanfattning: The question this study seeks to answer is whether a rejection of metaphysical realism implies that it is impossible for us to make statements about an independent reality that we share with one another, statements that may be evidence-transcendent truths. Some of the problems that are discussed in the philosophy of religion presuppose metaphysical realism. Sometimes metaphysical realism is seen as our only chance to conceive of utterances concerning God as statements about a shared independent reality. This study argues, in contrast, that metaphysical realism is an untenable philosophical perspective that ought to be rejected.In reconstructing and criticizing relevant aspects of the work of Quine, Putnam, Alston, Dummett and Davidson a non-metaphysical realist position is developed, a position which allows us to understand utterances made in religious contexts as statements about a shared independent reality and to consider them as evidence-transcendent truths without being challenged by the shortcomings of metaphysical realism. The non-metaphysical realist’s rejection of metaphysical realism forces us, however, to reflect afresh on the task and nature of the philosophy of religion. The philosophical enterprise is concerned with problematical situations that we human beings encounter. The philosopher of religion tries to resolve problems caused by the existence of religion; problems that people in our time have to tackle. While the problematical situations that we encounter change as our society changes, the problems that the philosopher of religion devotes herself to cannot once and for all be summarized as in a textbook. They are not limited to questions concerning God’s existence and properties, but include problems hitherto unnoticed in the philosophy of religion.